


uden klanglig realisering jo mere fremmed lydbilledet bliver. Op til 1950erne forbliver koncertformen dog i hvert fald på dette felt en dominerende faktor, også fordi radiomediet i så høj grad var koncentreret om at være et produktionsapparat for transmission af koncerter. Her bliver introduktionen af et fast magasinformat som *Vor tids musik* med forudsigelige sendetidspunkter, i en tid hvor radiolytning stadig kunne være et fælles referencepunkt for et musikmiljø, et magtfuldt instrument. Og i forbifarten gør Mogens Andersen opmærksom på, at det er den samme medietechnologiske udvikling, som i 1950'erne muliggjorde *musique concrète* og elektronisk musik, der lå til grund for den intensiverede radiodækning af den europæiske ny musik (s. 69). Det var nemlig i kraft af, at radiostationer nu kunne udveksle båndoptagelser, at der skete en markant forøgelse af det tilgængelige materiale. Dette blev udnyttet og sat i system, hvor man tidligere primært havde måttet operere med direkte internationale transmissioner.

Bogen er blevet til som del af et større projekt, der ud over registreringen, digitaliseringen og tilgængeliggørelsen af de bevarede udsendelser også omfattede udarbejdelsen af et interaktivt undervisningsmateriale til brug for især gymnasieskolen og videregående musikuddannelser. Disse dele af projektet er videreført efter Mogens Andersens død på projektets hjemmeside [www.vortidsmusik.dk](http://www.vortidsmusik.dk). Undervisningsmaterialet præsenteres her under titlen *Historien om vor tids musik 2.0* og er under stadig udvikling. De digitaliserede udsendelser kan udlånes fra Statsbiblioteket til et lokalt biblioteks læsesal. Der ligger en opdateret søgevejledning på projektets hjemmeside, der dog kunne være mere brugervenlig, og man skal i praksis nok have fat i en bibliotekar, hvis man vil have materialet frem. Disse dele er under stadig udvikling og kan sammen med bogen være en god indgang for både den nysgerrige, underviseren og seriøse studerende.

Michael Fjeldsøe



Peter Kivy

*Antithetical Arts. On the Ancient Quarrel Between Literature and Music*

Oxford: Clarendon Press / Oxford University Press, 2009

275 pp., music exx.

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Peter Kivy's latest book can hardly be said to offer what its title promises. Reading the subtitle *On the Ancient Quarrel Between Literature and Music* one expects some kind of analysis of competing claims of cultural value and/or superiority on behalf of literature and music respectively. But this is not the book's subject. The quarrel in question is that between musical formalists and advocates for diverse forms of literary interpretation of absolute music. And strictly speaking it is not 'on' this quarrel, but definitely 'in' it. Kivy's book is not an unbiased analysis of the quarrel but a contribution to it. An engaged contribution one must say, at times even with a touch of aggressiveness. In short: this book is still another contribution to Kivy's great project within the philosophy of music. It is an attempt to answer 'the foes of formalism' and to defend to 'the integrity' of absolute music (p. 202).

The book is in three parts. Part one, 'The Founding of Formalism', takes issue with Immanuel Kant's contributions to a theory of musical formalism and with Eduard Hanslick, particularly with Hanslick's well known rejection of absolute music's capability of expressing or arousing emotions.

In part two Kivy confronts 'the foes of formalism'. An array of more recent aesthetic theories and/or interpretative practices that in Kivy's view implies false assumptions concerning

absolute music's capabilities is scrutinized and rejected. This goes for the idea that music, though incapable of expressing or arousing emotions, might be able to engender 'moods' (Noel Carroll). It goes for theory and interpretative practice centred round the concept of the 'musical personae' (Edward T. Cone, Jenefer Robinson). And it goes for theory and interpretation centred round the concepts of 'action and agency'. (The 'action and agency' branch of literary interpretation of absolute music asserts that what is going on in a piece of pure instrumental music can be interpreted as action caused by human agency, even if no concrete agents can be pointed out.)

In part three – after all this analysis and rejection – Kivy at last approaches the question of absolute music's true capabilities. But he proceeds cautiously indeed and on the basis of the intermediary conclusion that neither formalism nor its foes have been able convincingly to explain what absolute music has to offer the listener. This is the situation according to Kivy, and he carefully stresses that no remedy is in sight. '[T]he phenomenon of absolute music', he states, '*still* seems to me, when all is said and done, a divine mystery' (p. 202). In an attempt to get at least a glimpse of an explanation to this mystery Kivy engages in a discussion of the issue of a possible relation between music and morality. This discussion follows the path we know from Kivy's discussion of the issue of music and emotions, and we must be inclined to expect that it will end up with similarly negative conclusions: in the same way as music lacks the cognitive apparatus necessary to represent feelings, it lacks the cognitive apparatus necessary to engage in issues of morality or to engender effects on the listener's moral behaviour or character. Kivy asserts, however, that there is some truth in the idea of a relation between music and moral character, even if it is in a very restricted way. '[G]reat music uplifts us', Kivy states, and 'makes us for the period of listening experience, feel a kind of exaltation ... And surely, even though this experience has no lasting beneficial effect on our character (and there is no evidence that it does) it would not be wrong to say that *during* that experience, at least we are better people; our characters are, during that experience, themselves made better' (p. 230). The acknowledgement of this temporal beneficial effect on the listener's character is the only new positive statement about value and effect of absolute music I have been able to find in the book. The rest is analysis and rejection.

Kivy's book can be read as a heroic attempt to protect absolute music from misinterpretation, to protect that very little that can truly be said about it from an ocean of untruth. But it is hard for me to sympathize with this sort of heroism. It ends up with too much quarrel, and I am not convinced of the value of continued quarrelling in a discursive setup of German 19th-century origin. It is also difficult for me to recognize anything genuinely new in Kivy's rejection of the 'literary' party or in his very sparse positive statements on the virtues of absolute music. Quarrelling might simply be an unproductive way of doing, and I shall do my best to avoid that this review develops into a quarrel between philosophy and history, which, however, is an obvious risk when a music historian is asked to review a book like this.

According to Kivy, his book is 'decidedly *not* meant to be a history of musical formalism' (preface, p. viii). The approach is that of the philosopher, not that of the historian. But still Kivy deals with historical sources. This, of course, triggers a number of critical questions when his book is read by a music historian. Some of the questions relate to the validity of the interpretation of the historical texts, some to more fundamental questions of methodology.

In several cases I am seriously in doubt about Kivy's readings. Some examples: is it plausible to assert a substantial link between late 18th-century theories of musical expression and 'narrative interpretation' on the basis of a short quotation from J. G. Sulzer's encyclopaedia *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste*, where composers are advised to learn the emotions they wish to express musically from 'some drama, happening or situation'? Based on this single quotation and without elaborate paraphrasing Kivy does so (p. 19).

Can we – without any discussion of the historical development of the concept – assert that Kant uses the word ‘theme’ (*Thema*) in a present-day sense as musical theme? Kivy does so (p. 50). There are, however, good reasons to believe that the concept ‘theme’ in Kant’s discussion of ‘... free fantasies (without a theme), and indeed, all music that is not set to words’ (p. 50) must be understood as ‘sujet’ (a concept referring to content) rather than as ‘musical theme’ (a (later) concept referring to material and structure).

And is it tenable to translate the word ‘pathological’ in Hanslick’s famous rejection of musical listening aiming at emotional response into ‘subjective’ (p. 63)? Judged by etymological consideration and confirmed by a close reading of the passage in question, it much rather refers to notions of ‘Fremdbestimmtheit’ (being submitted to external determination). Hanslick’s juxtaposition of ‘genuine aesthetic enjoyment’ and ‘pathological excitement’ (pathologisches Ergriffensein) is a matter of being or not being in control of oneself. Thus it is also a contribution to the lively 18th- and 19th-century discussion of music, character, and ‘ethos’.

‘As far as I know’, Kivy states in the preface, ‘a history of musical formalism has never been written’ (p. viii). His handling of the historical documents testifies the need for a new major work on this issue. But much has already been written, some of the best by Carl Dahlhaus. Is Kivy’s neglecting of this a matter of prejudice? And/or are my problems with the book a matter of prejudice? I do not hope so.

Actually I have profited from the reading; less, however, from its development of its theme, and more from its persistent standing by a refreshingly ‘different’ position. As a music historian of ‘relativist’ or ‘constructionist’ leaning I am inclined to view the struggle scrutinized by Kivy not as matter of true or false assertion of essential musical properties but as a matter of competing interpretative strategies. I also look differently at the relation between aesthetic discourses on music and music itself. I do not view the aesthetic discourses only as a bundle of more or less correct statements about essential musical properties inert to discursive interference. I am convinced that aesthetic discourses – as historical negotiations of what music is, or will, or can be – interfere with these properties!

Across this epistemological abyss, however, I have learned from the reading of Peter Kivy’s *Antithetical Arts*. However ‘hermeneutically’ inclined I may be, I willingly accept that not every interpretation is plausible, and however ‘constructivist’ I may be, I concede that music cannot be constructed arbitrarily.

‘No’ is a nice two-letter word. And Peter Kivy is an excellent teacher in the noble art of using it.

Søren Møller Sørensen



Birgitte Stougaard Pedersen  
*Lyd, litteratur og musik: Gestus i kunstoplevelsen*  
 Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2008  
 177 pp., incl. 1 CD  
 ISBN 978-87-7934-354-2  
 DKK 198

Musical meaning – i.e. how and why we invest music with meaning – has been a key issue in musical aesthetics for centuries. In the 19th and early 20th century, the question was mostly related to discussions about musical representation (e.g. in early musical hermeneutics and in the ‘War of the Romantics’ between Eduard Hanslick and his rivals). In the middle of the 20th century the issue was generally taken in a more epistemological